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I. INTRODUCTION
Many lawyers, judges, and academicians who have studied the
tension between copyright protection and the fair use1 defense
have concluded that predicting copyright fair use law requires the
balancing of numerous equitable factors and a good deal of luck.2
Many judges and commentators think that fair use case law is
largely unprincipled and unpredictable. This orthodox view holds
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1992. B.A., University of Utah, 1989. J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1992.
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1993.
1. The fair use doctrine provides an exception to the generally broad protection af-
forded to authors by copyright. It allows secondary users to use and copy an original work
while neither obtaining permission nor paying any fee to the author. For a more complete
explanation of copyright and fair use, see infra notes 12-49 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, 298 UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (1989); MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER. & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A) (1992) [hereinafter
NIMMER]; WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 362-63 (1985)
[hereinafter PATRY].
3. See, e.g. Scott M. Martin, Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use: The Dupli-
cation of Error, 39 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y, 345, 392 (1992). See also Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn,
Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (referring to the fair use issue as "the most trouble-
some in the whole law of copyright"); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (claiming the fair use doctrine "is so flexible as virtually to defy
definition").
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that obtaining a fair use exception in court is simply a matter of
marshalling a greater number of emotionally appealing equities for
fair use than the creator of the work can offer against fair use.
We disagree. The central theme we develop in this Article is
that fair use is a predictable, necessary, and principled exception
to the general protection offered by copyright law. We propose that
the multi-pronged balancing test typically employed in fair use
cases, in reality, implicitly recognizes only the principle of market
substitution. We contend that the case law exhibits this inner con-
sistency, which for too long has gone misunderstood. The case law
exhibits a strong tendency to take one overriding principle into ac-
count - the principle of market substitution.' We contend that the
following simple rule predicts fair use outcomes: the case law sup-
ports a finding of fair use only when the secondary use' does not
act as an economic market substitute for the original. If market
substitution is found, then the fair use defense will fail. To support
our premise, we examine the history, public policy, case law, and
federal copyright and fair use statutes.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE LAW
The term "copyright" literally means the exclusive right to
copy, and vests a bundle of rights in the creator of intellectual
property.6 Copyright law, both ancient and modern, is founded on
the fundamental notion that adverse economic incentives are cre-
ated if unrestricted copying of intellectual products is permitted.
With such adverse incentives, society will have much less creative
innovation than it might wish to encourage. Therefore, the empha-
sis of copyright law is on the benefits derived by the public from
the creative efforts of authors. Reward to copyright owners or au-
thors is necessary, but of secondary consideration.8 Historically,
4. For a more detailed discussion of our theory, see Michael G. Anderson and Paul F.
Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of
Law, 24 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 143 (1993) [hereinafter Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair
Use] (discussing the economic principles that support copyright and fair use law); see also
James R. Sobieraj and Michael G. Anderson, Contracting for Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: An Application to Intellectual Property, 2 INTELL. PROP. L. INT'L ANALYTICAL REv. J. 8
(forthcoming June 1993) (discussing the federal courts' recognition of the economic ele-
ments in copyright law).
5. "Secondary use" in this article refers to the use made of copyrighted material by a
second user.
6. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to copy the work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1) (1976).
7. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4 at 159 n.83.
8. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The copyright
[Vol. 10:33
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MARKET SUBSTITUTION AND COPYRIGHT
the exception to copyright protection, known as fair use, applied to
circumstances where the policy of rewarding an author's creativity
would not be undermined.'
Leaving intellectual property unprotected produces disincen-
tives for people to create new works. Without protection, as soon
as an innovator produced a new creative work, someone else could
steal it. 10 This dilemma inherent in intellectual property presents a
classic free rider problem."
The common law of copyright and fair use implicitly recog-
nized the tension among the issues of free ridership, disincentives,
monopoly, and access to information. The fair use doctrine eventu-
ally developed to address this tension: In some limited circum-
stances, the fair use doctrine permits someone other than the au-
thor to copy a copyrighted work without the author's permission. 2
A. Early Copyright Law in the United States
Although its roots are found in the early 1700's, the doctrine
of fair use did not fully emerge in the United States until the mid-
nineteenth century. 13 Based loosely on the English Statute of
Anne,'4 each of the original American colonies adopted its own
particular variant of copyright law.15 Later, the Framers of the
United States Constitution sought uniform copyright laws for the
new nation.' Article One of the Constitution empowers Congress
to enact laws "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
... ., The language used in the Constitution outlines the clear
utilitarian purpose of promoting "the Progress of Science and the
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration." (quot-
ing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
9. See infra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
.10. Id.
11. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 159-60 (A "free
rider" is someone who gains the benefit of an undertaking at the costs of others, without
personal cost). See also Roy J. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS,
at 24-25 (1985) (discussing free goods and free riders).
12. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
14. 8 Statute of Anne, ch. 19 § 1 (1710). "Books hereafter published shall, before such
publication be entered in the register book of the company of stationers .... I Id. The Stat-
ute of Anne was the first copyright act passed by the Parliament in England.
15. See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundations of American Copyright Law:
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1172-73 (1983).
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19931
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useful Arts."'" The constitutional reward of a copyright monopoly
gives authors an incentive to create works for the public good.19
B. Folsom v. Marsh: The Cornerstone of the Fair Use
Doctrine
Folsom v. Marsh0 represents the classic exposition of the fair
use doctrine and is still authoritatively cited as valid law.21 In Fol-
som, the plaintiffs were printers and publishers who had purchased
a valid copyright from the author of The Writings of George
Washington.22 The defendants were a book-selling company and
the author of The Life of Washington in the Form of an Autobiog-
raphy.23 The defendants admitted at trial that in writing their ver-
sion of Washington's autobiography, they had copied 388 pages, or
5.7 percent, from the plaintiffs' treatise verbatim.24
The Supreme Court found the defendants guilty of infringe-
ment, and dismissed the defendants' fair use claim.25 In Folsom,
Justice Story explained that large portions from an original work
may be cited in a critical review, if the clear purpose of the copying
is for the purpose of criticism.26 However, if a third party cited the
most important parts of a copyrighted work, "with a view, not to
criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work," that use
was an infringement and would not be permitted.27
Justice Story reasoned that allowing unlimited copying, when
the secondary copying competed with the first use of the original
work, would discourage the creation of future works.28 He then
stated the now-famous test of fair use: "[W]e must often . . . look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
18. Id. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 160-61
(describing the economic and utilitarian motives behind the copyright provision in the
Constitution).
19. Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 160-61.
20. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
21. Folsom was the first American case to recognize the fair use exception to copyright
law, which developed in England in the mid-eighteenth century. See also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985); Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984).
22. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 343. The work, 6,763 pages bound into 12 volumes, consisted
of both private and public letters of the first president. The plaintiffs were the only known
publishers of some of this material. Id. at 343-44.
23. Id. at 343.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 349.
26. Id. at 344.
27. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 347.
[Vol. 10:33
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value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work."2 9
Relying on the common law principles of fair use articulated
by Justice Story in Folsom, Congress passed the Copyright Act of
1976.30 In passing the Copyright Act, Congress recognized the im-
portance of the fair use case law. In fact, the Act was passed to
"restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way."3'
Contrary to the opinion of many commentators, 2 the fair use
cases do not serve to confuse rather than resolve the issues.3 3 Fair
use need not be understood as an unorganized collection of excep-
tions to the rules of copyright. Instead, fair use should be under-
stood as a rational and necessary part of copyright law, the obser-
vance of which is essential to achieve the goals of that law.34 The
cases reveal an underlying rationality. They also show that eco-
nomic substitution is the appropriate standard by which to analyze
fair use.
C. Fair Use Under the Copyright Act of 1976
Congress codified the copyright and fair use case law in the
Copyright Act of 1976.11 Section 107 of the Act governs fair use.
The preamble to section 107 lists several examples of what might
be successful assertions of the fair use defense.36 Drawing on Fol-
som, Congress enumerated four factors for determining whether a
use qualifies as a fair use. The four factors are formulated in sec-
tion 107 as follows:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
29. Id. at 348.
30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1976).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 66 (1976).
32. See supra note 3.
33. See Martin, supra note 3, at 347.
34. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, at 1107-09
(1990).
35. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1976).
36. The statute states that: "[use] for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching (including multiple copies of classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C § 107 (1976). These purposes can be regarded
as uses that will not compete with the author's original work. See also Anderson & Brown,
Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, 163-76.
19931
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righted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.37
Fair use cases decided after the 1976 Act focus their analysis
on the four statutory factors of section 107. Although Congress had
hoped that the Copyright Act would clarify the existing law and
lead to a more uniform and predictable body of case law,38 courts
frequently have had difficulty articulating the four-factor analysis.
Despite the expressed intent of Congress.not to enlarge the fair use
law,39 some courts have accorded each of the four factors equal
weight and applied a balancing test. Because of the ambiguity of
section 107, many courts look to the section's legislative history for
guidance in balancing the four factors.40
D. Public Policy in Favor of Copyright Fair Use
The Constitution explains that copyright protection is unmis-
takably tied to serving the utilitarian goal of progress in science
and the useful arts.4 1 The Supreme Court still acknowledges the
original utilitarian principle underlying copyright law. In Harper &
Row v. Nation Enterprises,42 the Court stated that "[tihe rights
conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the
store of knowledge a fair return for their labors"43 and "to moti-
vate the creative activity of authors ... by the provision of a spe-
cial reward."44 Therefore, copyright law "rewards the individual
author in order to benefit the public."' 5 The Supreme Court has
also confirmed that fair use limitations exist when exclusive intel-
lectual property rights will not serve the progress of the useful arts.
In Sony Corp., the Court explained, "The copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consider-
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). These factors closely parallel those announced by Justice
Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). See infra notes 20-31
and accompanying text.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 65-66 (1976).
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
40. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 146-47 (discuss-
ing the legislative history and the "Agreement on Classroom Guidelines" and their applica-
bility to fair use law).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use,
supra note 4, 163-64.
42. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
43.. Id. at 546 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
44. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984)).
45. Id. (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 10:33
6
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/4
MARKET SUBSTITUTION AND COPYRIGHT
ation.' '46 When enforcement of copyrights would not advance the
constitutional goals behind the law, a fair use defense will be
successful.4
In Folsom, Justice Story implicitly relied on classical economic
principles when denying the defendant in that case the right to
copy."' The purpose of Story's analysis was to determine if the sec-
ondary use could become a substitute for the original work. He
stated that "if [the alleged infringer] thus cites the most important
parts of the work, with a view .. . to supersede the use of the
original work, and substitute [the secondary use] for [the original
use], such a use will be deemed in law a piracy [or unfair use]."4"
The Supreme Court continues to recognize that if secondary copies
are allowed to substitute for original works, a disincentive for indi-
vidual creativity would result. This disincentive is precisely what
the enactment of the first U.S. copyright statute was intended to
prevent.
III. PREDICTING THE OUTCOME OF FAIR USE CASES: A
RECOGNITION OF ECONOMIC MARKET SUBSTITUTION 50
In analyzing each of the four Copyright Act factors, the focus
should remain on the historical purpose of preventing a substitu-
tion of the original work by the secondary work.5 ' The historical
46. 464 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
47. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 163-64.
48. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347.
49. Id. at 344-45.
50. We have scrutinized federal fair use case law after 1976 and have found no hold-
ings that refute our theory of market substitution.
Our view of the case law does not purport to explain a line of copyright cases known as
"Parody or Disparagement," where defendants often claim fair use. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose
Music v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (infringement for rap artist who parodied
music from another entertainer); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) (infringement liability for defendants who produced a
poster that was similar to the plaintiff's poster but with topless cheerleaders); Walt Disney
Production v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (infringement liability for defend-
ant's comic books that parodied plaintiff's cartoon characters); Berlin v. E.C. Publications,
Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) (infringement liability for defendant's magazine that paro-
died plaintiffs' songs); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolf Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (no infringement liability for defendant whose television commercial spoofed the
plaintiff's Eveready "Bunny"); Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (infringe-
ment liability for defendants whose sculpture duplicated and parodied the plaintiff's "Pup-
pies" photograph); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (no infringement liability for defendants television skit that parodied plain-
tiff's movie).
51. See Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 166-169.
1993]
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background explains why the four factors should not be under-
stood to be a litany of requirements that must be met or balanced.
Rather, the statutory factors of the 1976 Act may best be under-
stood as providing four different perspectives on one central test:
Does the defendant's use act as a market substitute for the origi-
nal work? If it does, then the copier is infringing. If not, the copier
is entitled to the fair use defense.
A. Purpose and Character of the Secondary Use
In analyzing the first factor of section 107 of the Copyright
Act 52, the key inquiry is whether the "purpose and character" of
the secondary use is so similar in nature to that of the primary use
that the one can serve as a substitute for the other. For example, if
the purpose and character of both the primary and secondary use
is educational, then the likelihood of a substitution occurring is in-
creased. However, if the purpose and character of the primary use
is political commentary, for example, and the secondary use is en-
tertainment, then a fair use is likely to be found. Some of those
who have studied the fair use problem have erroneously concluded
that the courts should determine the purpose and character of the
secondary use and then check it against a list of uses favored as
good public policy." These commentators may be relying too much
on what courts are saying rather than what courts are actually
doing.54
For example, section 107 cites a "nonprofit educational pur-
pose" as a characteristic that will not interfere with the ordinary
"commercial nature" of copyrighted work. 5 However, a "nonprofit
educational purpose" may not always indicate a fair use. In Mar-
cus v. Rowley, for instance, the defendant's employee, a public
high school teacher, copied eleven out of thirty-five pages from the
plaintiff's cake decorating book.56 Although the purpose and char-
acter of both the primary and secondary works was educational,
and the purpose and character of the defendant's use was unques-
tionably nonprofit,57 the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant in-
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992).
53. Basic Books Inc., v. Kinkos Copies Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
54. Of course, courts often make a correct decision, even if they have difficulty articu-
lating the reasoning. When attempting to predict the outcome of actual cases, it is advisable
to look at what courts actually do, rather than what they say.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992).
56. 695 F.2d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 1983).
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fringed by copying the plaintiff's book.58 The court held that a sec-
ondary use that is created for the same intrinsic purpose as the
original work provides "strong indicia of no fair use." '59 Thus,
under Marcus, copying for educational and nonprofit purposes
does not necessarily shield the defendant from infringement liabil-
ity. In fact, if the secondary use overlaps with the purpose and
character of the primary use, the secondary use is not likely to be
considered fair use.
Marcus is not the only case that seems confusing without the
substitution analysis. In Harper & Row,10 the defendant copied the
plantiff's manuscript for a news magazine article. Although section
107 of the Copyright Act lists criticism, comment, and news report-
ing as ordinarily fair uses,"1 the Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant's use was not a fair use.2 Since the purpose and character
of both the plaintiff's and defendant's works was the same, 3 (i.e.,
both uses related to news reporting), the secondary use could effec-
tively substitute for the original work. The defendant's secondary
use was such a successful substitute that the market for the plain-
tiff's original copyrighted work was totally destroyed. 4 Thus, the
Court noted that "[w]ith certain special exceptions ... a use that
supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work
would ordinarily be considered an infringement."6 5
The court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc."
reiterated the idea that a defendant's profit should not be determi-
native. In Hustler, a caricature of the defendant, Jerry Falwell, was
featured as a cartoon in Hustler Magazine. Falwell photocopied a
page from the plaintiff's magazine and used the copy for the pur-
pose of raising money for the Moral Majority.6 7 As a result of the
fundraising, the defendant received over $700,000.8 Because the
defendant used the photocopied cartoon for a profit-making pur-
58. Id. at 1178.
59. Id. at 1175.
60. 471 U.S. at 543 (1985).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
62. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citation omitted). The Court also mentioned that
"the fact that a publication was commercial ...tends to weigh against a finding of fair
use." Id. at 562. However, the Court's dicta can be a trap for the unwary. The profit factor
cannot explain why, when almost all newspapers operate for a profit, the general rule is that
profit-making newspapers have a broad privilege with respect to fair use.
66. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
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pose, the orthodox fair use reasoning would hold that the use was
presumptively unfair. However, the Hustler court held that while
the purpose and character of Falwell's use was certainly profit-
making or even purely commercial,69 it was so different from the
magazine's use, that the defendant was entitled to the fair use ex-
ception.70 Thus, in Hustler the decisive factor was whether the
purpose and character of the secondary work was sufficiently simi-
lar to the purpose and character of the plaintiff's original that the
secondary work could serve as a market substitute for the primary
work.
Furthermore, in Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.,'1
the purpose and character of the primary and the secondary uses
was educational." In Basic Books, a neighborhood college
copyshop, Kinko's Graphics, made photocopies of the plaintiff's
textbook material for use in college classrooms." The court denied
fair use, finding Kinko's to be an infringer .7  The purpose and
character of both the college textbooks and the photocopied course
packets created by the copyshop was educational. Because they
covered the same subject area as the textbooks, the course packets
could become a total substitute for the copied textbooks. Had the
course packets not contained excerpts from textbooks, but rather
excerpts from a law review not marketed for sale to students, for
example, a fair use might have been allowed. Regardless of its
profit-making status, or the educational values involved, Kinko's
created an economic substitute for the original work. As in Marcus,
Harper & Row, and Hustler, the question of whether Kinko's use
is best characterized as commercial or nonprofit and educational is
misleading and unnecessary.
The best understanding of the first prong of the section 107
fair use test is that the focus should not be on the absolute purpose
and character of the copyrighted work. Only the purpose and char-
acter of the original work relative to the secondary use is relevant.
Fair use is allowed when the purpose and character of the two
works is different enough that an economic substitution cannot
occur.
69. Id. at 1156.
70. Id.
71. 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
72. Id. at 1531.
73. Id. at 1526.
74. Id. at 1547.
[Vol. 10:33
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B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Mainline fair use commentators have suggested that when the
purpose of the work is factual in nature, the original Work is enti-
tled to less copyright protection." Although the creative versus
factual distinction may seem consistent with the general rule that
facts and ideas are not protected by copyrights, the distinction
simply does not explain the case law, unless one compares the pri-
mary use to the secondary use. The second factor provides another
perspective on the question of fair use. Courts use the second fac-
tor to examine whether a secondary use can serve as an economic
substitute for the original work.
Fair use will be allowed by the law when the "nature" of the
two works does not overlap.76 In Hustler v. Moral Majority," the
Ninth Circuit allowed the secondary user to photocopy a creative
cartoon of Jerry Falwell. The court noted that the original work
was "more creative than informational, '78 and in dicta stated that
the creative nature of the work weighed against a finding of fair
use.79 Such reasoning seems to follow the orthodox view of fair use.
However, despite the creative nature of the plaintiff's work, the
Hustler court permitted the secondary use because the defendant
did not use the secondary work for its creative value. 0 Thus, even
though the nature of the plaintiff's work was creative, the defend-
ant was entitled to a fair use privilege because he used the creative
work in an informational way.1
Comparison of the nature of the primary and secondary uses
occurred again in Iowa State University Research Foundation,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.82 In Iowa State,
the defendant network broadcast portions of the plaintiff's short
biographical film of a college wrestler without permission. 3 Again,
the orthodox approach to fair use would hold that since both works
were factual and informative, the second factor should weigh in
favor of fair use.84 However, the court held against a finding of fair
75. See Leval, supra note 34, at 1117.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1992).
77. 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. Id. at 1154.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1156.
81. Id. at 1154.
82. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 58-59.
84. See Leval, supra note 34, at 1117.
1993]
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use." The court in Iowa State stated the concept well: "Where the
two works in issue fulfill the same function," fair use is unlikely to
be found."6 This is another way of stating that for a finding of fair
use, the "nature" of the primary and secondary uses should not
overlap.
Although the dicta in some opinions has suggested that to as-
sess the second factor the court must consider whether the copy-
righted work was in print or out-of-print,8 7 these distinctions can
be viewed as further evidence of whether the copyrighted work will
suffer an economic substitution by the secondary work. For exam-
ple, courts have considered the unpublished nature of the original
work an important reason for denying fair use.8 8 This denial re-
flects an implicit recognition that an unpublished work is espe-
cially susceptible to substitution by a secondary user. In Salinger
v. Random House, Inc.,89 the plaintiff, J.D. Salinger, sought to en-
join the publication of an unauthorized biography that contained
quotes from his unpublished letters.90 The Second Circuit denied
the defendant publisher a fair use claim, stating that "[unpub-
lished] works normally enjoy complete protection against copying
any protected expression."9 As shown in Salinger, when a work is
unpublished, a secondary user can deny a copyright holder the
benefits of first publication. After the secondary user has pub-
lished, the copyright owner cannot profitably publish because the
copy has garnered all the demand for the original.
To predict case outcomes, one should understand this second
section 107 factor as follows: The absolute nature of the copy-
righted work should not be the focus; only its nature relative to the
secondary use is relevant. Fair use is allowed when the nature of
the two works is so dissimilar that they do not overlap and result
in a market substitution.
85. Iowa State, 621 F.2d at 62.
86. Id. at 61 (quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(B) at 13-58 (1979)).
87. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1533 (1991). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553-64 (1985).
88. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. "The fact that a work is unpublished is a
critical element of its 'nature.'" Id.
89. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
90. Id. at 92.
91. Id. at 97.
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C. Amount and Substantiality Used
The third statutory factor of section 10792 provides another
method for comparing the secondary use to the original use to de-
termine if a market substitution is likely. In passing the third fac-
tor, Congress emphasized the comparison between the original and
secondary work.9 3 The orthodox analysis of the third factor consid-
ers the volume and significance of the copied work. The larger the
volume or the greater the significance of the portion copied, the
more likely that the secondary use will be found to infringe.9'
In Marcus,9 5 for example, the defendant copied approximately
half (15 of 35 pages) of the plaintiff's cookbook." Thus, the de-
fendant's packet served as an effective substitute for the plaintiff's
original work. Thus, Marcus fits under the orthodox reasoning
that extensive copying can defeat a claim of fair use.
However, the orthodox gloss is not always reliable. To predict
case outcomes accurately, the analysis must focus on the likelihood
of substitution when evaluating the amount copied. By focusing
merely on the amount copied, the usual understanding of the third
factor fails to account adequately for many of the case holdings. In
Iowa State,9" for instance, the defendant telecast only two and
one-half minutes of the plaintiff's twenty-eight minute film.99 The
defendant claimed that the amount copied was quantitatively "in-
significant.""' The court's implicit reasoning, however, was that
since the defendant's secondary use could substitute for the sale of
the plaintiff's film, the secondary use infringed.0 1
The Supreme Court has applied an analysis similar to the
Iowa State analysis of the third factor. For example, in Harper &
Row,10 2 the Court denied the defendant's fair use claim although
the amount copied was quantitatively insignificant. Quoting a mere
300 words from the plaintiff's large book, the defendant published
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1992).
93. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that a factor to be considered in deter-
mining whether a work is a fair use is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole .... Id.
94. See Leval, supra note 34, at 1122.
95. 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 1173.
97. Id. at 1177. One student who enrolled in the plaintiff's cooking class used the
defendant's packet and actually refused to purchase the original cookbook. Id.
98. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 59.
100. Id. at 61.
101. Id. at 61-62.
102. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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its own version of President Gerald Ford's memoirs."' 3 Despite the
minimal copying, the Supreme Court held against the defendant. 104
Stating that the qualitative importance of the material taken must
also be considered, the Court noted that the defendant copied
what was essentially the "heart" of the original work.10 5
However, the Court's dicta, which implies a qualitative analy-
sis, may be misleading. In Hustler,10 6 defendant Jerry Falwell pho-
tocopied 100 percent of the plaintiff's original work. Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit allowed Falwell a fair use, because the secondary
use, a Moral Majority newsletter, was unlikely to siphon off de-
mand for Hustler Magazine.0 7 The court in Hustler focused on
the likelihood that the secondary use would substitute for the orig-
inal work.
Thus, the case law seems consistent only if the third factor is
viewed as follows: the absolute amount copied by a secondary user
is not important; rather, fair use is allowed when the amount cop-
ied from the original work is such that a substitution may not
occur.
D. Effect of the Use on the Markets for the Copyrighted
Work
The fourth factor, "the effect of the [secondary] use on the
potential market for the copyrighted work,"' 08 is the most obvious
way to understand the principle of market substitution for an orig-
inal work. The fourth factor best captures the genius of Justice
Story's Folsom analysis. 0 The Supreme Court has recognized that
this fourth factor is "undoubtedly the single most important ele-
ment of fair use." 10 This recognition may reflect the Court's im-
plicit understanding of the market substitution theory underlying
fair use law. The fourth factor is most highly correlated with the
substitution effect."'
103. Id. at 544-45.
104. Id. at 550. The Court implicitly recognized the substitution analysis when it
stated that "the fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that 'supersede[s] the use of
the original.' " Id. (citations omitted). "With certain special exceptions ... a use that sup:
plants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered
an infringement." Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 564-65.
106. 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 1154.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1992).
109. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
110. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
111. Id. See also Anderson & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 232.
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However, not every type of market impairment opposes fair
use. The key to predicting the fair use cases is determining
whether the substitution effect was the cause of the market impair-
ment. For example, a criticism in a book review may impair a
book's market and still be a fair use.'1 2 In New Era Publications
Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group," 3 the defendant published an un-
flattering biography of L. Ron Hubbard that included quotations
from Hubbard's copyrighted works. Although the biography un-
doubtedly had a marginally negative effect on the sale of Hub-
bard's own works, the defendant was granted a fair use because
any market damage was not the result of a substitution in the mar-
ket place for the original work." ' In Hustler, even though the de-
fendant admittedly sought to impair the market for the plaintiff's
adult magazines, the secondary use did not substitute for the origi-
nal work; therefore, the fair use privilege applied. " 5
When the secondary use substitutes for the original work, the
secondary use infringes and fair use will be denied. In Stewart v.
Abend," ' the defendants, Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy Stewart,
created the 'successful movie Rear Window, based on the plaintiff's
popular story, without permission. " ' In finding the defendants'
movie an unfair use of the plaintiff's original work, the Supreme
Court stated "that re-release of the film impinged on the ability to
market new versions of the story.11 8 In other words, if the plaintiff
were to decide to make a movie based on his story, the defendants'
movie would be a substitute in the market for the plaintiff's poten-
tial movie.
This same reasoning is reflected in Iowa State."9 If the de-
fendant in Iowa State had been allowed to broadcast portions of
the plaintiff's film as a fair use, there would have been little, if any,
market demand for the plaintiff's original film. 20 The opportunity
to own and market copyrighted films and television programs pro-
vides incentives to continue to create such works. If the defendant
in either Stewart or Iowa State had been allowed to substitute his
secondary use for the plaintiff's original work, the incentive for
112. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
113. 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990).
114. Id. at 160-61.
115. Hustler, 796 F,2d at 1156 (9th Cir. 1986).
116. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
117. Id. at 211-12.
118. Id. at 238.
119. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
120. Id. at 62.
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"authors" to create such works would have decreased.
Thus, the fourth factor provides another perspective through
which to view the question of market substitution in fair use cases.
Accordingly, the focus should not be on the absolute amount of
market harm caused by a secondary user, only on market harm
that is caused by economic substitution matters.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The orthodox view has consistently held that fair use is un-
principled and unpredictable; that it is a concession to conflicting
interests; and that any case that falls outside the orthodox theory
has been wrongly decided. However, the history, statute, and case
law on the fair use doctrine recognize the principle of market
substitution.
Practitioners can take some comfort in knowing that the fair
use case law is more predictable than those who hold the orthodox
view have argued. This Article has shown that an underlying ra-
tionality can be found in the fair use case law. This rationality rec-
ognizes the principle of economic substitution as a guiding force.
Courts presented with fair use questions find fair use only when
the secondary use does not act as a market substitute for the origi-
nal work. When a secondary use siphons off demand for the origi-
nal by acting as a substitute, however, the secondary use is found
to infringe, and fair use is denied.
The statutory factors of the Copyright Act should be seen as a
way to reach this determination. Assessing secondary uses in light
of the market substitution analysis, as we have presented, accu-
rately accounts for all the significant fair use cases handed down
since 1976.121 The fair use case law provides an inner consistency
more likely to predict case results than the confused orthodox
analysis. To predict fair use case outcomes more successfully, prac-
titioners must look to the facts and holdings of the cases, concen-
trating on what the courts are doing, rather than the broad lan-
guage they employ.
Finally, since the cases reveal an understanding of economic
substitution as the proper guiding force for fair use analysis, in liti-
gation, practitioners may wish to employ the services of an expert
economist to construct market models addressing the issue of mar-
ket substitution.122 Economists may be able to build models that
121. But cf. supra note 50 and accompanying text.
122. One familiar market representation is the cross-price elasticity model. See Ander-
son & Brown, Economics and Fair Use, supra note 4, at 174 (discussing the cross-price
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may persuasively assist the trier of fact in a manner similar to the
use of market surveys in trademark infringement cases-"'
elasticity model as applied to copyright fair use); Michael G. Anderson and Paul F. Brown,
Cross-Price Elasticity and Fair Use: Predicting Copyright Infringement, presentation at
Northwestern University School of Law (February 3, 1992); at the Marriott School of Man-
agement at Brigham Young University (October 22, 1992) (on file with authors) (explaining
how the cross-price elasticity model can serve as a quantitative definition of market substi-
tution, and therefore as evidence denying the fair use defense).
123. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussing the validity of market survey data in a trademark infringement case). The loss of
market share in a fair use case may be analogous to the loss of market share in a trademark
case. See Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Consolidated Distilled Products, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 639
(1981) (loss of market share indicative of trademark infringement).
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Fair use should be denied when the secondary use is a substitute for
the orginal use. Subsitiution may be defined by the cross-price
elasticity of the two uses. Note that when the price of the secondary
use is lowered from P 1 to P2 the quanity demanded of the orginal use
drops from Q I to Q2. This drop is indicative of market substitution
and thus represents instances where the fair use defense to copyright
infringment should be denied.
© ANDERSON & BROWN (1993)
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